Why Isnt Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotional Purposes As Basis For Self-Organization :: Logic Philosophy

Why Isnt Consciousness Empirically Observable? Emotional Purposes As Basis For Self-OrganizationABSTRACT Most versions of the experience argument say that if a scientist observing my brain does not know what my ken is like, then sentience is not identical with physical brain processes. This unwarrantedly equates physical with empirically observable. However, we can conclude only that awareness is not identical with anything empirically observable. Still, given the intimate connection amongst each conscious event (C) and a corresponding empirically observable physiological event (P), what P-C relation could render C empirically imperceptible? nearly suggest that C is a relation among Ps which is distinguishable because it is multi-realizable that is, C could have been realized by P2 rather than P1 and still have been the same relation. C might even be a self-organizing process, appropriating and replacing its own material substrata. How can this account explain the empirical un observability of consciousness? Because the emotions motivating attention direction, partly constitutive of phenomenal states, are executed, not undergone, by organisms. Organisms-self-organizing processes actively appropriating their needed physical substrata-feel motivations by generating them. Thus, experiencing someones consciousness entails executing his or her motivations. That there is something empirically unobservable about phenomenal consciousness follows from a modified knowledge argument. Traditional versions (Jackson 1986 Robinson 1982 Noren 1979) hold that if experiencing were equivalent with physical brain states, then complete empirical knowledge of brain states should constitute knowledge of everything about my experiencing but complete empirical knowledge of brain states would not constitute knowledge of everything about experiencing (those alone wouldnt light upon what its like to have that experience) therefore, experiencing is not equivalent with physical brai n states. This argument can be criticized for unwarrantedly assuming that everything physical is empirically observable (from an experimenters standpoint). E.g., Jackson assumes that the what its like aspect isnt expressible in physical language (291), but the reason for granting this assumption is that what its like is inexpressible in terms of possible empirical observations. Without the assumption that everything physical is empirically observable, we can conclude, not that consciousness is non-physical (since there might be physical processes that are observationally inaccessible), but simply that consciousness isnt identical with anything empirically observable. Still, given the intimate connection between each conscious event (C) and a corresponding empirically observable physiological event (P), what P-C relationship could render C empirically unobservable? If identical, they should be equally observable. I.e., if P EO and C not-EO, then PC.